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THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Daniel A. Farber* and John E Muench**
Most of the vast historical literature about the fourteenth
amendment addresses the legislative intent regarding specific issues such as school segregation. Our purpose is broader. Our
concern is less with whether the framers believed in school segregation than with how they felt about natural law. What did they
regard as the sources of human rights? How did they think those
rights related to the Constitution? In what ways did they expect
the amendment to change that relationship? How did their ideas
about rights relate to their thoughts about citizenship and government, and to the experiences of Civil War and reconstruction?
Our goal, then, is an intellectual history of the amendment.
Our thesis is that the fourteenth amendment was based on a
coherent theory of government. By the time it attained power in
1861, the Republican party had become identified with a well-articulated theory of rights. This theory was something of a compromise between natural law and legal positivism. Like natural
law, it envisioned a body of inherent human rights protected by a
social contract. But like positivism, it recognized that a legislature
could impose its will regardless of natural law. Natural law and
associated concepts like the law of nations provided rules that
functioned as law except where they were displaced by positive
legislation.
Before the Civil War, this theory enabled the Republicans to
condemn slavery as a violation of higher law, to argue that it was
illegal in the territories where it lacked express legislative sanction, but at the same time to concede its legality in the South.
During reconstruction, this theory continued to provide the
• Professor of Law. University of Minnesota.
•• Member. Illinois Bar. The authors would like to thank Professor Paul Murphy
for his helpful comments on portions of this manuscript.
NOTE In the interest of readabilit;·.footnoting has been drastically reduced Virtuallr
all references to secondary sources have been eliminated and manr citations to prima~r
sources have been eliminated or combined Readers who desire further information should
consult the ..Note on Sources" at the end of the article.
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framework for Republican thought. The fourteenth amendment
was intended to bridge the gap between positive law and higher
law by empowering the national government to protect the natural
rights of its citizens.
I

We begin by examining the ideas the Republicans brought
with them when they achieved national power in 1861. The Republican party of 1861 was not a monolith; even the antislavery
wing had its share of feuds and shifting coalitions. Nevertheless,
it is appropriate to speak of the antislavery leadership-men like
Sumner, Seward, Chase, and later Lincoln-as a coherent group,
united by ideology as well as strong social bonds. Their ideas
would become the intellectual basis of the fourteenth amendment.
A

Many of the antislavery leaders had worked together in the
Free Soil party before becoming Republicans. They were also
connected by a web of social and professional contacts. For example, when Lincoln was in Congress, he lived in the same rooming house as Giddings. Lincoln's law partner corresponded with
Sumner, who was in close contact with most of the other major
leaders of the antislavery group.
Because antislavery leaders were ostracized by Washington
society, which was dominated by Southerners, they were driven
together socially. Other forms of Southern antagonism also
helped bind the group together. After Sumner was severely
beaten on the Senate floor by a Southern congressman, Cameron,
Wade, and Chandler entered into a pact to use deadly force if
necessary to repel attacks. The antislavery Republicans were not
a conspiracy, but neither were they an atomistic collection of unconnected individuals.
Much of what they said about rights sounds naive today. But
they were far from being unsophisticated idealists. Sumner, a
close friend of Justice Story, wrote a number of law review articles
and lectured at Harvard Law School. Despite the "rail-splitter"
myth, Lincoln was a shrewd, successful railroad lawyer. Seward,
the future Secretary of State, has been called the ablest constitutional authority of the period. A self-educated cobbler, Wilson
became a successful manufacturer, a senator, and later an historian. Before becoming governor of Ohio, Chase was a leading
Ohio lawyer; later he was to become Chief Justice of the United
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States Supreme Court. These were not simply starry-eyed
dreamers.
Their views were well-known to the public. Interest in politics was intense, with voter turnouts reaching as high as eightyfour percent of qualified voters. The public followed Senate debates closely. In one year alone, free-state senators distributed
680,000 copies of their speeches. Seward's famous "Higher Law"
speech was distributed to 100,000 people. In the 1860 campaign,
the Republican party issued large editions of the Lincoln-Douglas
debates in order to publicize Lincoln's views. These speeches
would not have been circulated so extensively unless politicians
were convinced that they would appeal to large portions of the
public. Antislavery views were also publicized at public rallies.
For instance, Charles Frances Adams once addressed a Philadelphia rally of nearly half the city's voters. The antislavery leaders
were highly successful in having their views incorporated into
early GOP state platforms and much of their viewpoint was represented in the 1856 and 1860 national platforms. When the North
elected Lincoln in 1860, it could hardly have been ignorant of his
views and those of many of his party's leaders.
What were their views? Ironically, they favored prohibiting
slavery in new territories, where there were few slaves, but opposed intervention in the South, where there were millions. 1 Both
parts of this "anti-extensionism" program are significant. Lincoln
considered the territorial principle so important that he rejected
all proposals to compromise on this issue to avoid civil war. On
the other hand, some antislavery Republicans like Adams were
willing to support the proposed thirteenth amendment, which
would have permanently protected slavery in the states from federal interference.
One reason for opposition to slavery in the territories was racism, which was widespread in the North. For many, the issue
was not so much exclusion of black slaves as exclusion of all
blacks. Many Republicans found it necessary to reaffirm their
-----~--~-~

---

I. In the debates with Douglas. Lincoln stressed that he had ··no purpose. directly or
indirectly. to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists." THE
POLITICAL DEBATES BETWEEN ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEt-< A. DOUGLAS (Part I)
209 (G. Putnam ed. 1913); see also 1d. at 53. As Rep. Hoard said in the debates on Kansas:
With regard to slavery in the States. we have no difficulty: and the slave-States
need entertain no fears of any free-State interference.
CoNe,. GLOBE. 35th Cong. 1st Sess. App. 275 ( 1858). See also id .. 33d Cong .. 2d Sess. App.
318 (1855) (Rep. Giddings) (North will"be purified from the crimes and iniquities of slavery" but "leave the institution with the slave States, untouched by our legislation." thus
guarding "all the States in the enjoyment of their privileges.")
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disinclination toward miscegenation2 and their belief in white
supremacy.3 Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the
case. Men such as Adams, Hale, Wilson, Seward and Chase vigorously supported black rights in the North. The antislavery faction used its political leverage in Ohio to gain a repeal of the
harsher provisions of the state's Black Code, and strong Republican support existed for black suffrage. Stevens went so far as to
direct that he be buried in a black cemetery. Prominent antislavery Republicans, including John Bingham, objected strongly to
the exclusion of free blacks from homestead rights in Oregon.
While racism played a larger role with the rank-and-file, it was at
most a secondary factor influencing the Republican antislavery
leadership. 4
Apart from racism, there was great concern about the effect
of slavery on whites. Northern antislavery writers portrayed the
South as an economically backward area. They compared decrepit rural Virginia with prosperous New England, and blamed
the contrast on slavery. They also compared the ambitious white
workers of the North with their less educated and allegedly less
motivated counterparts in the South, concluding that slavery produced inferior white workers. In short, they saw slavery as inimical to prosperity. They were particularly anxious to shield the
promising new territories of the West from this economic blight.s
Slavery was also thought to pose a political threat to whites.
As Sumner put it, "laws which oppress the black man, and deprive him of all safeguards of liberty, will eventually enslave the
white man." Many believed that the South was controlled by a
slave-owning oligarchy known variously as the Slavocracy or the
Slave Power. Through its control of the Democratic party, its representation in the Senate, and its over-representation in the House
under the three-fifths rule, the Slave Power had supposedly seized
control of the country. In the Lincoln-Douglas debates, for example, Lincoln portrayed Douglas as a member of a Southern plot to
2. This was a constant theme in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates. See. e.g .. LINCOLNDoUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I. (Part I) at 103.216.270: (Part II) at 2: K. STAMPP. THE
IMPERILED UI'ION: ESSAYS ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE CiVIL WAR 121 ( 1980).
3. Within the Free Soil party, racism was strongest among Bambumers (who generally returned to the Democratic party) and weakest amongst former Liberty party members. with the Conscience Whigs in the middle. See J. MAYFIELD. REHEARSAL FOR
REPUBLICANISM 21-22, 35-36,47-48, 142, 158 (1980).
4. See E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CiVIL WAR 263, 280-95 (1970).
5. Foner develops this point at length. See E. FoNER, supra note 4. at 40-65. Given
the common view that God had designed the world in such a way that the naturally good
and the utilitarian coincided, this economic critique of slavery actually supported the view
that slavery was morally wrong.
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extend slavery nationwide.6 Like conspiracy theories in other periods of the nation's history, the Slave Power theory held that the
hour was late and that only immediate action could preserve freedom. This alarmist view drew strength from a number of Southem actions: assaults on first amendment rights, demands for
protection of slavery in the territories, attempts to annex Cuba or
other parts of Latin American as new slave states, the Dred Scott
decision, and the Kansas-Nebraska bill.
Moral opposition to slavery was another powerful influence. 7
Lincoln proclaimed that this moral stance was the primary difference between himself and Douglas. For many Republicans, opposition to slavery was religiously based. Hale and others thought
slavery was a sin, forbidden by the Word of God, while Giddings
called opponents of the Republicans "infidels." Chase declared
that "the cause of human freedom is the cause of God." Others
believed that slavery was prohibited by the Bible because God
gave Adam dominion over the beasts, but not over his fellow men.
Many antislavery leaders also based their views on the Declaration of Independence, with its stress on inalienable rights and inherent equality.
Given this moral position, why did the antislavery Republi6. LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I, (Part II) at 160-61 (Lincoln predicts a
"second Dred Scott" decision will extend slavery nationwide). In his famous "House Divided" speech, Lincoln summarized his conspiracy theory as follows:
(W]hen we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have
been gotten out at different times and places and by different workmen-Stephen
(Douglas]. Franklin [Pierce], Roger [Taney] and James [Buchanan], for instance-and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they exactly
make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortices exactly fitting.
and all the lengths and proportions of the different pieces exactly adapted to their
respective places, and not a piece too many or too few-not omitting even scaffolding---{)r, if a single piece be lacking, we can see the place in the frame exactly
fitted and prepared to yet bring such piece in-in such a case, we find it impossible to not believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood
one another from the beginning. and all worked upon a common plan or draft
drawn up before the first lick was struck.
2 A. SCHLESINGER, HISTORY OF U.S. PoLITICAL PARTIES 1226 ( 1973).
7. See LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I, (Part I) at 53 (unlike Douglas.
American people view slavery as a "vast moral evil"); id. (Part II) at 268 (morality of
slavery is "the real issue"). In the 1860 Campaign. Douglas was attacked on this policy by
a pro-Lincoln paper. which said that "(t]he conscience of the country will not permit this
abnegation of the moral element." H. PERKINS, I NoRTHERN EDITORIALS ON SECESSION
31 ( 1942). The Hariford Evening Press said during the same campaign that the "chief question at issue is one of conscience, involving high moral obligations." /d. at 61. In an
editorial entitled "The Last Struggle of Slavery," the Springfield (Mass.) D01{r Republican
said it was "the unanimous verdict of Christendom and heathendom alike. our southern
states and the [slave trading] kingdom of Dahomey excepted. that the institution of slavery
is the worst possible perversion of human relations and the most entire violation alike of
natural and divine law." /d. at 481. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Dubuque
Dailr Times. /d. at 488. See also id. at 29-31.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:235

240

cans devote their energy to the seemingly unimportant question of
slavery in the territories? There are two sides to the answer: they
thought the territorial issue was important; and they thought slavery in the states was beyond their reach.
They believed the territorial issue was important partly for
symbolic reasons, but they were also seriously concerned that
slavery might expand westward. It had taken hold in Missouri
and might do so elsewhere in the Great Plains, perhaps causing
the ultimate economic ruin of this vital area. Moreover, the South
had shown an interest in expanding into Latin American and the
Caribbean, areas to which the plantation system was well-suited.
On the other hand, if slavery were confined, it might be expected
to die. Diminishing political power in the national arena would
weaken the Slavocracy's power in the South. The mails would be
opened to antislavery literature, which would soon enlighten
lower class whites about their real interests. Federal patronage
might help develop an opposition party in the South. Equally important, without room to expand the South would lack an outlet
for its excess population of slaves. Meanwhile, national recognition of the immorality of slavery would undermine the ideology
essential to its continuance. Thus, confining slavery would "put
... [it] in the course of ultimate extinction," as Lincoln put it.s
Somewhat more graphically, Sumner said slavery would die "as a
poisoned rat dies of rage in its hole."9
Despite their moral opposition to slavery, the Republicans
went to great lengths to disassociate themselves from the abolitionists. Unlike Garrison, they were unwilling to condemn the
Constitution as an "agreement with Hell." They rejected both
Northern secession and personal withdrawal from government as
means of avoiding entanglement with slavery. They also rejected
the unrealistic view of some abolitionists that the Constitution
prohibited slavery in the states. Thus, Republicans were committed to opposing slavery while supporting a Constitution that
shielded Southern slavery. Men like Lincoln believed they were
giving away nothing by pledging not to use federal power to abolish slavery in the South, for they believed the federal government
lacked this power anyway. As Owen Lovejoy said, being against
monarchy didn't mean he favored a naval armament to dethrone
Queen Victoria.
8.

See

9.

D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CiVIL WAR

LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES,

supra note I, (Part l) at 52-53.
361 (1960).
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B

To justify their opposition to slavery, the Republicans needed
a philosophy that satisfied several requirements. It had to provide
a moral frame of reference outside the status quo from which to
assess the morality of slavery. Yet it had to leave room for the
unchallenged right of the South to remain free of direct Northern
interference within the federalist system. The antislavery Republicans were not original thinkers and would not have been capable
of inventing such a theory. And, like other reformers in our history, they were anxious to portray themselves as guardians of the
original American tradition, not as inventors of a novel ideology.
Fortunately, a system of thought was at hand that satisfied all
these requirements. The antislavery Republicans found the intellectual framework they needed in the Enlightenment theories that
had formed the ideological basis for the American Revolution.
Locke is the best remembered of these Englightenment thinkers. His Second Treatise opens with a discussion of the state of
nature, in which men are free from all government but subject to
natural law. Among their natural rights are the right to continued
life and to any property created by their own labor. All men are
equal in the sense of having an equal right to this natural freedom.
(The source of these rights is not entirely clear, but seems to be
partly theological. Men are obliged to respect each other's rights
because all men are God's handiwork; to harm another man is to
interfere with God's purposes in creating him. 10) In the state of
nature, each man has the power to punish transgressions of natural law by others. Because this power cannot be effectively exercised by unorganized individuals, men delegate their enforcement
powers to governments. These governments possess only the
power that was granted through the delegation: the power to protect the natural rights of men. "[T]he law of nature stands as an
eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others." 11 If the government should exceed its powers and turn against the people,
nothing remains but an "appeal to Heaven," that is, revolution.
10. For instance. Locke says:
For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitelY wise Maker
.. they are his property. whose workmanship the~ are. made to list during his.
notone another"s pleasure: and .
there cannot be supposed any such subordinatiOn among us . . as if we were made for one another"s uses.
J. LocKE. THEe SEcor-;o TREATISE OF CI\IL GoVERNMLNT 5 (J Gough ed. 1946). There
seem to be as many interpretations of Locke as there are commentators. Fortunate!\. the
subtle problems which divide these commentators are largely irrelevant for our purposes.
since none of the antislavery Republicans were intellectually attuned to technical philosophical issues.
II
/d. at 68.
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Lockean theory was remarkably congruent with Republican
ideology. The vision of the state of nature must have seemed
fairly realistic in a frontier society. Locke's labor theory of property accorded well with the Republican stress on free labor in the
territories and their generally conservative views on the right to
property.12 More important, although Locke was willing to tolerate slavery under very limited circumstances, his theories provided powerful arguments against it. Fundamentally, ownership
of one person by another was inconsistent with their basic equality
as creations of God. More specifically, slavery as practiced in
America violated Locke's theory in three respects. First, the
slave's natural right to life was allegedly not protected under slavery. In some Republicans' view, in any event, the slave was simply at the mercy of the owner. Second, slaves were denied their
natural right to property in the fruit of their own labor. Third,
slaves were excluded from the social compact.
Although they have been largely forgotten today, three other
writers of the natural law school were highly influential in eighteenth and early-nineteenth century America. These were
Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui. As his major modern commentator says, Pufendorf "is known to American students-when
he is known at all-as an obscure German with a funny name
who followed Grotius in the early development of international
law."l3 His theory stressed man's social nature and his duty to
protect his fellow men. He also emphasized human equality and
the compact theory of government. Like Pufendorf and Locke,
Burlamaqui adopted a compact theory under which government
acts in excess of the granted power are invalid. Vattel's work
stressed self-defense as a natural right. A nation is obliged to preserve its members and respect their natural right to self-defense.
If the sovereign violates these fundamental rights, the populace as
a whole can withdraw obedience. Even individuals have a right to
resist extreme injustice, for self-preservation is not only a natural
right, but also a duty.
These early natural law theorists created two distinct but connected sources of "higher law" thought. One was the "law of nations," a set of legal norms governing the rights and duties of
nations. The other was the American version of natural law and
compact theories of government, adopted in the eighteenth cenSee E. FONER. supra note 4. at 11-39.
L. KRIE<iER. THE POLITICS OF DISCRETIOI'O:
N.-\TURAL L-\W I ( 1965).
12.
13.

OF

PUFENDOR~ Ai'OD THE AccEPTAi'OCE
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tury. Both lines of thought persisted into the nineteenth century
and entered into antislavery Republican ideology.
The law of nations has no exact counterpart today. It was a
blend of what we would now call public international law, political theory, conflicts law, and commercial law. It was linked with
natural law primarily by the idea that nations have no common
sovereign and therefore are in a state of nature with respect to one
another. According to Kent, the law of nations derived from
"principles of right reason, the same views of the nature and constitution of man, and the same sanction of Divine revelation, as
those from which the science of morality is deduced." The law of
nations was based on the "general principles of right and justice,
equally suitable to the government of individuals in a state of
equality, and to the relations and conduct of nations."I4
The idea of an unwritten international law was characteristic
of the legal thought of the time. This was, after all, the age of
Sw!ft v. Tyson and the "brooding omnipresence" of the common
law. In Sw!ft itself, Justice Story declared that negotiable-instrument law was, paraphrasing Cicero, not merely "the law of Athens or Rome" but that of the whole commercial world. The
extraordinary influence of these ideas can best be seen in Watson
v. Tarpley .Is Watson was a diversity case brought on a bill of
exchange by a Mississippi citizen in the federal circuit court for
Mississippi. A Mississippi statute prohibited suit on any bill of
exchange until the maturity date, even if the drawee refused acceptance. The Court refused to follow the Mississippi statute because "[a] requisition like this would be a violation of the general
commercial law, which a state would have no power to impose,
and which the courts of the United States would be bound to disregard."t6 Other Supreme Court decisions apply a similar theory
to state insolvency laws, holding them valid in the courts of the
legislating state but not in the courts of any other state or of the
United States. 17 Thus, the idea of an unwritten law, controlling
except when a court was directed otherwise by its own legislature,
was deeply embedded in the legal thinking of the time.
The law of nations was not silent on the subject of slavery.
Justice Story, beginning with the premise that slavery is immoral,
14. See l J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW •2-3.
15. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517 (!855).
16. /d.at52l.
17. Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. ( l Wall.) 223 ( 1863). See also Williamson v. Berry. 49
U.S. (8 How.) 495 ( 1850) (Court refuses to follow state courts in construing state private
law): Gelpke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. ( l Wall.) 175 ( 1863) (Court refuses to follow state
court in construing state constitution).
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argued that it must be prohibited by the law of nations; the prohibition was judicially enforceable unless "waived by the consent of
nations." He concluded that a slave ship is guilty of piracy except
when the flag state permits the slave trade.ts Chief Justice Marshall accepted a similar premise:
That [slavery) is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied. That
every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labour, is generally admitted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will, seems to be the necessary result of this admission.

He found, however, that the practice of nations fell lamentably
short of this standard and hence that the slave trade did not violate internationallaw.t9 The same ambivalence was reflected in
Kent, who declared that although the slave trade was immoral
and unjust, it was not piracy unless so declared by treaty or municipallaw.zo The attitudes of these Americans were undoubtedly
influenced by a desire not to give support to British claims of a
right to visitation of American ships on the high seas.
Unhampered by this consideration, Story was able to say that
foreign jurists and tribunals uniformly gave "no effect to the state
of slavery of a party, whatever it might have been in the country
of his birth or [previous domicile], unless it is also recognized by
the laws of the country of his actual domicil [sic], and where he is
found, and it is sought to be enforced." Excepting only cases governed by the fugitive slave clause, "the same principle pervades
the common law of the non-slaveholding States in America; that
is to say, foreign slaves would no longer be deemed such after
their removal thither."21 Many American cases supported the
view that slavery could exist only when supported by local, positive law. In cases where slaves had been brought to free states for
more than a brief sojourn, even Southern courts generally ruled
that they remained free on their return to slave states.22 The
Republicans made strong use of this "slavery local, freedom national" view.23 Indeed, without it, anti-extensionism would have
18. United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 Fed. Cas. 832, 846, 847-851 (C.C.D. Mass.
1822) (No. 15,551).
19. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120-132 (1825).
20. J. KENT, supra note 14, at *194-200.
21. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DoMESTIC,
§ 96 (5th ed. 1857) (citing numerous cases) (footnotes omitted).
22. See D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND PoLITICS 50-61,611-14 (1978).
23. For statements on the local nature of slavery ("slavery local, freedom national")
see CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong. 1st Sess. App. 332, 335 (1858) (Rep. Walton); id at App. 79
(Sens. Fessenden and Mason); id. at 87-90 (Sen. Clark); CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., _1st
Sess. App. 938 (1856) (Rep. Brenton); id. at 201 (Sen. Trumbull), id. 1164 (Rep. Cragm).
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been untenable, for the slave relationship would have been automatically transported from Southern states into the territories.
The natural law tradition also entered Republican thought by
shaping the ideology underlying the American Revolution. When
they adopted the Declaration of Independence as the basis of their
platform, the antislavery Republicans were incorporating a synthesis of eighteenth century natural law thought.
Well into the nineteenth century, natural law philosophy continued to play an important role in American law. In Calder v.
Bu/1,24 Justice Chase declared that even without express constitutional limitations, state governments were limited by "certain vital
principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative
power."zs In Fletcher v. Peck, Chief Justice Marshall, not content
to rest on the contract clause, also relied on "general principles
which are common to our free institutions."26 A number of state
court decisions asserted a similar view in the earlier part of the
nineteenth century.27
Early nineteenth century commentators also adopted natural
law theories. Kent called the rights of personal security, liberty
and property "natural, inherent and unalienable." Drawing on
natural law writers like Pufendorf, he held that the legislature's
power to take private property was limited by principles of natural
equity.zs Other writers like Rawle and Story believed that the
people have an inherent right to change governments or to amend
their constitutions without regard to constitutional limitations on
the amending process. Natural law concepts were also expressed
by notable lawyers.
By the 1850's, however, a somewhat diminished degree of belief in natural law became apparent, along with growing skepticism about the reality of the social compact. Increasingly, the
24. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386-389 (1798).
25. Dean Ely suggests that Chase could not really have been a believer in natural law.
since he failed to strike down the state statute in question. Ely, Foreword· On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 26 n.95 (1978). The explanation for Chase's
position seems to be, however, that the case was before the Coun on writ of error to a state
coun, giving the Coun jurisdiction only over federal constitutional claims. See J. GOEBEL.
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, 704-07 (1971).
26. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
27. See Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Szvles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth-Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 531-32 (1974).
28. 2 J. KENT, supra note 14, at •1, 339. See also Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns 477.
505 (N.Y. 1811) (implicit prohibition on retroactive Jaws).
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compact was seen as a convenient fiction.29 State courts ruled in
this period that they had no inherent power to declare laws void
because of conflict with natural law.Jo Growing reliance on express constitutional provisions like the due process clause made
reference to natural law superfluous. Jacksonian Democrats were
hostile to such assertions of power by judges, while conservatives
were increasingly troubled by the potential of natural law theories
to encourage secession, rebellion, or civil disobedience.JI Natural
law ideas were still advanced by advocates and still appeared in
strongly worded dissents. But the judicial tide appeared to be
running against them.

c
Although natural law was losing favor in the courts, it continued to influence antislavery Republicans. In a famous speech,
Seward said that "there is a higher law than the Constitution"
governing Congress.32 In the same speech, he declared that slavery was incompatible with natural rights. Similarly, Wade said he
would never recognize the right of one man to own another
"[u]ntil the laws of nature and of nature's God are changed."JJ
For Sumner, the Mexican War was "wrong by the law of nations,
and by the higher law of God."J4 Another staunch defender of
the higher law was John Bingham, who later played a crucial role
in drafting the fourteenth amendment. He replied to criticisms of
the "higher law" theory as follows:
(T]he fathers of the Republic never would have made their Constitution; they
never would have borne the sacred ark of liberty through a seven years' war. if
they had not believed in a higher law-in the eternal verities of truth and justice.
That law is of perpetual and of universal obligation. It is obligatory alike upon
individual and collective man; upon the citizen and upon the State.35

In a similar vein, Charles Francis Adams said that the "cardi29. See, e.g. Piqua Branch of State Bank v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369,392 (1853)
.
(theory of government not relevant to judicial decisionmaking).
30. See Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855); People v. Gallagher, 4 Mtch. 244 ( 1856);
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 390-92 (1856) (Comstock, J.); id. at 411-13 (Johnson,
J.); ld. at 430-433 (Selden, J.); State v. Peckham, 3 R.I. 289 (1838); Lincoln v. Smith. 27 Vt.
328 (1855). Accord, T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 180-181
(1857).
31. See Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theorr in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1166, 1180 (1972); Corwm, The
Doctrineo/Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 460.469-71 (1911).
32. CoNG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 265 (1850).
33. H. TREFOUSSE, BENJAMIN fRANKLIN WADE 36 (1963).
34. D. DoNALD, supra note 9, at 146.
35. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 83 (1861).
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nal principle of the Revolution" was that "the individual man,
whether in or out of the social organization, . . . has certain rights
which his fellow-man all over the globe is bound to respect." 36
While arguing a case, Chase gave perhaps the clearest exposition
of these principles:
The provisions of the constitution. contained in the amendments, like the
provisions of the ordinance, contained in the articles of the compact, were mainly
designed to establish as written law, certain great principles of natural right and
justice, which exist independently of all such sanction. They rather announce
restrictions upon legislative power, imposed by the very nature of society and of
government, than create restrictions, which, were they erased from the constitution, the Legislature would be at liberty to disregard . . . . The Legislature cannot authorize injustice by law; cannot nullify private contracts; cannot abrogate
the securities of life. liberty and property, which it is the very object of society, as
well as of our constitution of government, to provide; cannot make a man judge
in his own case; cannot repeal the laws of nature; cannot create any obligation to
do wrong, or neglect duty. No court is bound to enforce unjust law; but, on the
contrary, every court is bound, by prior and superior obligations, to abstain from
enforcing such law. It must be a clear case, doubtless, which will warrant a court
in pronouncing a law so unjust that it ought not to be enforced; but, in a clear
case, the path of duty is plain.37

Similarly, John Hale argued that a New Hampshire jury was
obliged to give no more effect to a law recognizing slavery than it
would give a law recognizing ownership of moonbeams.
For moderates like Abraham Lincoln, belief in natural law
did not imply immunity from the duties imposed by positive law.
For example, Lincoln maintained that if elected to Congress, it
would be his duty to pass legislation enforcing the fugitive slave
clause. For him, natural law was like the law of nations, interstitial and capable of being displaced by positive law.
Others took a sterner view of the commands of natural law.
Of the fugitive slave law, Giddings said, "[l]et no man tell you that
... there is no higher law than this fugitive slave bill," and he
vowed to resist its enforcement.Js Giddings also thought slaves
had the legal and moral right to use force to escape, going so far as
to defend an uprising and murder by slaves aboard a slave ship.
Ben Wade, later a leading radical Republican, was elected to the
Senate on a platform of disobedience to the fugitive slave law.39
These sentiments were not confined to Congressional debates. In
Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin, there were notable instances
36. /d., 1st Sess. 2514 (1860).
37. W. PEASE & J. PEASE, THE ANTISLAVERY ARGUMENT 391-92 (1965).
38. R. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY, 1830-1860, at 207 (1949).
39. H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS: LINCOLN'S VANGUARD FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 53 ( !969).
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of forcible resistance to the fugitive slave laws, sometimes with the
support of the state courts. As Governor of New York, Seward
refused to extradite individuals accused of helping slaves to escape, reasoning that stealing slaves cannot be theft because no law
can convert men into property.
For many Republicans the "higher law" had a religious basis.
For example, the Rockford Register said that the equality of man
was "a truth not obvious to the senses, but one that is hidden in
God, and revealed to those only who in all sincerity approach
Him." It went on to say that the basis of human equality is that
"when life is all derived from God, no one can have a claim to
superiority over another."4o Lovejoy (brother of the abolitionist
editor) expounded upon the biblical passage, "He that stealeth a
man and selleth him, . . . he shall surely be put to death." Later
in the same speech, Lovejoy admonished Southerners, "Instead of
chattering your gibberish in my ear about negro equality, go look
the Son of God in the face and reproach him with favoring negro
equality because he poured out his blood for the most abject and
despised of the human family."4t Giddings accused Southerners
of authorizing the sale of Christ in the person of his followers.42
He held to the view that "all human governments . . . are subjected to the 'higher law' of the Creator, and authorized to legislate only for the protection of the rights which God has conferred
on mankind."43 Because of these views, the Free Soil party's platform proclaimed slavery a sin. For any Southerners who missed
the message, Hamlin warned that "nations, like individuals, must
answer to a higher power for the wrongs they perpetrate. "44 The
religious beliefs of these men not only provided an intellectual
foundation for their antislavery views, but also added an emotional resonance that could hardly have been obtained by quoting
Pufendorf or Vattel.
For many Republicans, however, the wellsprings of natural
law were to be found with the founding fathers rather than the
40. I H. PERKINS, NORTHERN EDITORIALS ON SECESSION 505, 506 (1942). See also
id. at 488 (Dubuque Daily Times); id. at 481 (Springfield (Mass.) Daily Republican).
41. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 197, 199 (1859). Despite his strongly
anti-slavery stance, Lovejoy enjoyed a high degree of popularity in his district. See W.
KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER, DAVID DAVIS 113-14, 117-19 (1960).
42. CoNG. GLOBE, 33rd Cong., 2d Sess. App. 33 (1854).
43. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 65 (1858). Later in the same passage.
he said that certain rights are "an element of the human soul; they cannot be alienated by
the individual; nor can any association of men, or any earthly power, separate the humblest
of the human race from them." /d.
44. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1003 (1858). See also id. at App. 95 (remarks
of Rep. Clark).
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biblical patriarchs.4s The Republicans went to great lengths to
demonstrate the antislavery sentiments of the founding fathers. 46
Much reliance was placed on Madison's opposition to the use of
the word "slavery" in the Constitution, as showing that the Constitution gave no sanction to slavery. Based on the statements of
the framers, the Constitutional debates, and the Federalist papers,
Seward stated the basic Republican position: "that the Constitution does not recognize property in man, but leaves that question,
as between the States, to the law of nature and of nations. That
law, as expounded by Vattel, is founded in the reason ofthings." 47
In two 1858 speeches, Hoard and Hale carefully catalogued antislavery statements by Jefferson, Patrick Henry, and others. 4s Also
relying on Jefferson, a Connecticut newspaper stressed his statement that he "trembled for his country when he remembered that
God is just."49 Jefferson's role in excluding slavery from the
Northwest territory was also cited, as well as a 1787 declaration
that the Americans had fought for "the cause of human nature. "so
Perhaps the most important source of antislavery Republicanism was the Declaration of Independence. Giddings and Adams both thought it part of the law of nations or American public
law. Other Republicans drew lengthy parallels between the actions of the Slavocracy and the list of grievances in the Declaration. Adherence to the Declaration became a kind of touchstone
for Republicans. In its 1860 platform, the party officially affirmed
its belief:
That the maintenance of the principles promulgated in the Declaration of
Independence and embodied in the Federal Constitution, "That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these
rights. governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed," is essential to the preservation of our Republican institutions; and that the Federal Constitution, the Rights of the States, and the Union
of the States must and shall be preserved. 51
45. !d .. 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 749 (1856).
46. See td. at App. 1170-72 (1856) (Rep. Leiter); id. at 124 (Rep. Bingham); id. at 39394 (Sen. Wilson); id. at 1160-1163 (Rep. Cragin); id., 35th Cong.. 2d Sess. App. 197. 199
(1859) (Rep. Lovejoy).
47. !d .. 31st Cong., 1st Sess. App. 264 (1850).
48. !d .. 35th Cong .. 1st Sess., App. 274 ( 1858); td. at 344. See also td. at 315 (remarks
of Sen. Hale).
49. I H. PERKINS, supra note 40, at 62. For other allusions to Jefferson's statement.
see CoNG. GLOBE. 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 750 (Sen. Wade); id. at 1203 (Rep. Gilbert);
td. at 1161 (Rep. Cragin); td .. 35th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 197 (1850) (Rep. Lovejoy); id., 36th
Con g .. 2d Sess. App. 82 ( 1861) (Rep. Bingham).
50. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. 1003 ( 1858) (Sen. Hamlin); td .. 34th Con g ..
1st Sess. App. 404-05 (1856) (Sen. Seward).
51. 2 A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 1239-40.
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This provision was not boilerplate, but instead was adopted out of
Parlimentary order when Giddings threatened a walk-out.
This platform comported well with the candidate's views.
Lincoln repeatedly stressed the Declaration in the Lincoln-Douglas debates. In one speech, for example, he said:
I adhere to the Declaration of Independence. If Judge Douglas and his friends
are not willing to stand by it, let them come up and amend it. Let them make it
read that all men are created equal except negroes. Let us have it decided
whether the Declaration of Independence, in this blessed year of 1858, shall be
thus amended.52

In another debate he argued that " [i]f [the] Declaration is not the
truth, let us get the statute book, in which we find it, and tear it
out. "s3 Lincoln used this attack on Douglas again and again in
the debates, perhaps most powerfully in the following passage:
I believe the entire records of the world, from the date of the Declaration of Independence up to within three years ago, may be searched in vain for one single
affirmation, from one single man, that the negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence; I think I may defy Judge Douglas to show that he ever said
so, that Washington ever said so, that any President ever said so, that any member
of Congress ever said so, or that any living man upon the whole earth ever said so,
until the necessities of the present policy of the Democratic party, in regard to
slavery, had to invent that affirmation. And I will remind Judge Douglas and this
audience that while Mr. Jefferson was the owner of slaves, as undoubtedly he was,
in speaking upon this very subject he used the strong language that "he trembled
for his country when he remembered that God was just"; and I will offer the
highest premium in my power to Judge Douglas if he will show that he, in all his
life, ever uttered a sentiment at all akin to that of Jefferson.54

Lincoln's views are particularly significant. Because he belonged
to the center of the party, he is considered "an ideal party leader
to examine in order to measure the thinking of average
Republicans."ss
For Lincoln, as for many others, the most important aspect of
the Declaration was its affirmation that "all men are created
equal." This stress on equality permeates the speeches of both the
Republican leadership and less prominent men. According to
Seward, the United States was "founded in the natural equality of
all men ... not made equal by human laws, but born equai."s6
In his view, the central idea of the Republican Party was the
"equality of all men before human tribunals and human laws," 57
52. LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I, (Part I) at 175.
53. /d. at 64.
54. !d. (Part II) at 13-114.
55. K. STAMPP, supra note 2, at 123.; see also id. at 134 (Lincoln's position represents
"the center of gravity" in the Republican Party).
56. See R. NYE, supra note 38, at 184 (emphasis in original).
57. E. FONER, supra note 4, at 38.
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an idea he also thought as native to the Constitution as "the blood
... is native to the heart."ss Sumner's passionate belief in legal
equality led him to argue, over a century before Brown v. Board of
Education, that school segregation violated "that fundamental
right of all citizens, Equality before the Law," because it branded
"a whole race with the stigma of inferiority."s9
What the Republicans meant by equality was legal equality.
Wilson praised his home state as "a commonwealth that throws
over the poor, the weak, the lowly, upon whom misfortune has
laid its iron hand, the protection of just and equallaws."60 Wade
declared that he stood "upon the Declaration of Independence" in
support of the idea that before the law all men are equa1.6t By
equality, he apparently meant the qualified legal equality existing
in the North.62 In a similar vein, Bingham said that the "Constitution is based upon the EQUALITY of the human race." Bingham saw in the Constitution several affirmations of the "equality
and brotherhood of the human race."63 As Lincoln observed:
I have said that I do not understand the Declaration to mean that all men
were created equal in all respects. They are not our equal in color: but I suppose
that it does mean to declare that all men are equal in some respects: they are
equal in their right to ''life, liberty. and the pursuit of happiness." Certainly the
negro is not our equal in color,-perhaps not in many other respects: still. in the
right to put into his mouth the bread that his own hands have earned. he is the
equal of every other man, white or black.64

The Declaration of Independence rested on a view about the
relationship between government and the people that many
Republicans were willing to adopt. There was wide agreement
among Republicans that governments derived their powers from
the consent of the governed. They viewed the federal Constitution as a compact by the people rather than the states. Even on
the eve of secession, Bingham conceded that the right of revolution was a "sacred and indefeasible" right, though he argued that
the South had no just grounds for rebellion. He also opposed the
proposed thirteenth amendment, which would have precluded fu58. CoNG. GLOBE. 31st Cong.. 1st Sess. App. 1023 (1850). In a somewhat similar
vein. Rep. Leiter suggested that the drafters of the Declaration "submitted their principles
to Almighty God. and received His righteous approval." /d .. 34th Cong.. 1st Sess. App.
1171 ( 1856).
59. Oral argument of Charles Sumner in Roberts v. Boston ( 1849). quoted in W.
PEASE & J. PEASE. supra note 37, at 288.
60. CoNG. GLOBE, 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 393 ( 1856).
61. /d. at App. 751.
62. See, e.g .. H. TREFOUSE, supra note 33. at 87.
63. CoNG. GLOBE. 34th Cong .. 3d Sess. App. 139. 140 (1857) (emphasis in original).
64. LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES, supra note I. (Part I) at 176. See also id. (Pan II)
at 115.
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ture amendments on slavery, because it struck at the "inherent
right of the people to alter or amend [the Constitution] at their
pleasure. " 65 Hale's belief in revolution found expression in praise
for Cromwell and the regicides.66 Belief in popular self-rule did
not, however, lead to a belief in unqualified majoritarianism.
Giddings believed that governments are "authorized to legislate
only for the protection of the rights which God has conferred on
mankind." 67 Bingham agreed that government's "primal object
must be to protect each human being within its jurisdiction in the
free and full enjoyment of his natural rights. "t>s
What were these natural rights? The Republicans found it
less necessary to address this question than to affirm that some
such rights did exist. Nevertheless, there are some useful clues to
their thinking on particular rights. In attempting to determine
what rights were considered fundamental, we may look to a long
period of Republican attacks on the South for denying a variety of
human rights. It is also useful to examine the legal literature and
cases of the period.
Freedom of speech and religion were clearly among the fundamental rights recognized in the 1850's. Anticipating Alexander
Meiklejohn, Kent stressed that free speech concerning governmental officials is essential to the "control over their rulers, which
resides in the free people of the United States." He also believed
that "civil and religious liberty generally go hand in hand." 69
Rawle agreed that "[t]he foundation of a free government begins
to be undermined when freedom of speech on political subjects is
restrained"; when such rights are denied, "life is indeed of little
value." As to religious freedom, he felt that the first amendment
merely restated Congress's lack of power in the area, since no one
could reasonably believe that "the general welfare of a nation
could be promoted by religious intolerance." 70 Similar views are
expressed in the influential work of Francis Lieber. who also supported the right to petition and freedom of association. 71
The Republicans stressed their agreement with these principles and criticized the South as an enemy of free speech. Gid65. CO!'G. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 82 (1861).
66. /d .. 35th Cong .• 1st Sess. 319 (1858).
67. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 65 (1858) . .Set' tilro J. STEW-\RT.
JOSHUA GiDDINGS AND THE TACTICS OF RADICAL POLITilS 171-172 11'176).
68. !d .. 34th Cong .• 3d Sess .. App. 139 ( 1857).
69. 2 J. KENT. supra note 14. at *17. 34-35.
70. W. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATicS 01 AM~.RI< .-\
121. 123 (1829).
71. f. LiEBER. ON CiVIL LIBERTY AND SELF GOVER!'OME~T S'l-'1'1. 124-30. 275-82
(1859).
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dings attacked the South for keeping slaves ignorant and
restricting freedom of speech in order to enslave the public mind.
"No injury to the body," he said, could "bear any comparison to
the enslavement of the intellect."n Lovejoy accused the South of
a despotism like Napoleon's in crushing freedom of speech and
the press.73 These assertions, echoed by other Republican leaders
and by the press,74 had deep historical roots. The antislavery
movement gained much of its strength from Northern reaction to
Southern attempts to limit first amendment rightsJs
The Kansas controversy in the late 1850's provided an important occasion for expression of civil liberties views. 76 The proslavery LeCompton government attempted to suppress antislavery
speech. Its attempts to do so were bitterly attacked by the Republicans. Wilson accused the LeCompton government of striking
down free speech, imposing "[t)est oaths, against which reason
and humanity revolt," and reducing the people of Kansas "to the
pitiable condition of conquered menials of the slave power." 77
Seward accused the Kansas legislature of making it "a crime to
think what one pleased, and to write and print what one thought,"
thereby borrowing "all the enginery of tyranny, but the torture,
from the practice of the Stuarts." 7s "Before you hold this enactment to be law," Bingham proclaimed, "burn our immortal Declaration and our free-written Constitution, fetter our free press,
and . . . put out the light of that understanding which the breath
of the Almighty hath kindled."79
Besides first amendment rights, property rights were also apparently considered fundamental. Protection of property was an
important part of early nineteenth century legal thought. Kent
viewed property as one of the"natural, inherent and unalienable"
72. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 66 (1858).
73. /d., 2d Sess .. App. 197 (1859).
74. See I H. PERKINS. supra note 40, at 77, 508-09 (editorials by the Chicago Dailr
Democrat); CONG. GLOBE. 31st Cong .. 1st Sess .. App. 268 (1850) (remarks of Sen. Seward);
id .. 34th Con g .. 1st Sess. App. 751 (1856) (remarks of Sen. Wade): id., 34th Cong., 3rd Sess.
App. 91 (1856) (remarks of Rep. Cumback).
75. R. NYE. supra note 38. at 40-69: 106-14, 119-20, 137-38. Note that the slogan of
the Free Soil party was "Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Speech, Free Men." J. MAYFIELD.
supra note 3, at 119 (emphasis added).
76. The 1856 Republican platform [reprinted in 2 A. ScHLESINGER, supra, note 6, at
1203-1205 (1973 )] charged that citizens of Kansas had been subjected to test oaths. denied
their right to a speedy trial, their right to be free from unreasonable searches, and their
rights to freedom of speech and of the press.
77. CoNG. GLOBE. 34th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. 854 (1856).
78. !d., 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. 941 ( 1858). Similar statements were made by Hale. Jd. at
317.
79. /d .. 34th Cong .. 1st Sess .. App. 124 (1856).
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rights.so Sedgwick argued that legislation destroying vested rights
in land would violate the just compensation clause, the due process clause, and inherent limits on the legislative power. Lieber
viewed the unrestricted freedom to acquire and produce property
as an important fundamental right. This view of the sanctity of
property was shared by many Republicans. Like several other
Republicans, Fessenden argued that the true "foundation of the
law of property" was divine.st Tappan said slaves were not held
on "the same ground of natural right" as that by which other
property was held.s2 One of the objections to slavery stressed by
Lincoln and others was that it deprived slaves of the right to the
fruits of their labor.s3 For these reasons, property can plausibly be
viewed as a fundamental right.
It is less clear whether the due process clause was thought to
provide substantive protection for property. Many state courts rejected substantive due process, the most notable exception being
New York's highest court.s4 On the other hand, the 1860 Republican platform adopted the view that the due process clause prohibited Congress from imposing slavery in the territories. This view
of due process, which obviously went beyond the merely procedural, was strongly endorsed by Bingham.ss Having imported at
least some substantive content into the clause, the Republicans
might have been willing to find protection for other fundamental
rights in the same place. The evidence is inconclusive.
It is not easy to tell which rights were considered fundamen80. See 2 J. KENT, supra note 14, at •t.
81. CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong .. 1st Sess. App. llO (1858).
82. /d. at App. 329 ( 1858).
83. In one notable passage. Lincoln said that slavery rested on the same principle as
"the divine right of kings":
It is the same spirit that says. "You work and toil and earn bread. and I'll eat it."
No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king who seeks to
bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor. or from
one race of men as an apology for enslaving another race. it is the same tyrannical
principle.
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES supra note I. (Part II) at 268.
84. The cases are reviewed at length in Corwin. supra note 31 at 366. 460 ( 1911). It
should be noted that some of the cases Corwin discusses are from states such as Rhode
Island in which the language of the state due process clause limited the clause to criminal
cases. Many of the cases also contain fascinating discussions of procedural due process.
85. See, e.g .• CoNG. GLOBE, 34th Cong.. 1st Sess. App. 124 (1856) (remarks of Rep.
Bingham). Dean Ely suggests that such references to due process may have meant only the
absence of adequate procedures. See Ely, Constitutional/nterpretivism: Its Allure and lmpoSSiblfitr. 53 IND. L.J. 399,417 n.76 (1978). The 1860 platform calls for legislation prohibiting slavery as the necessary enforcement of the due process clause. and this seems hard to
derive from a purely procedural view of due process. which would seem only to require
that individuals be given hearings to confirm their putative owner's title. See 2 A. ScHLESINGER, supra note 6, at 1240-1241.
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tal or the degree to which those rights could be regulated. Free
speech and property rights seem to be the clearest candidates for
inclusion on a Republican list of fundamental rights. Because so
much attention was devoted to slavery, and because slaves had
essentially no rights at all, the Republicans had little reason to
specify the precise contour of natural rights.
II

The Republican effort to establish a posiUve law basis for
fundamental rights began with the thirteenth amendment, which
eliminated the discrepancy between the natural right of personal
freedom and positive laws establishing slavery. In the Civil
Rights Act, they turned to the problem of providing statutory protection for the rights of the freed slaves. Finally, in the fourteenth
amendment, they sought to constitutionalize the higher law.
A

Lincoln's conciliatory inaugural address endorsed the proposed thirteenth amendment, which would have guaranteed the
legality of slavery in the states. But he also took the position that
the Union was perpetual and that secession was unconstitutional.
When the Confederates opened fire on Fort Sumter, the
North could hardly have been less well prepared for war. It had
virtually no army; it lacked a modern fiscal system with which to
finance the war; it had no real bureaucracy with which to organize
the war effort. Worse, the President had no clear authority to do
anything at all about secession, let alone take the drastic actions
required by the situation. Nevertheless, Lincoln did take decisive
action. He proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports, dispersed
funds to anti-secessionists without legal authorization, suspended
the writ of habeas corpus, and hastily mustered an army consisting of volunteers and state militias. Slowly, as Allan Nevins put
it, the North lurched to arms.
Lincoln also faced monumental political problems. Northern
Democrats were at best unenthusiastic about the War. The border
states, which had to be held if the Union was to survive, had
strong leanings toward the South and slavery. While attempting
to pacify them, Lincoln also had to maintain the support of his
own party, which contained strong antislavery forces. The party
itself was less than a decade old and had never before held national power. So Lincoln had to fight a war, mold a political
party, and create the machinery of wartime government all
concurrently.
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The relatively even position of the two parties, combined
with the need to keep the loyalty of the border states, required
Lincoln to take a cautious position on slavery. His position was
supported by those politicians who were tied to his administration
by patronage and by other political realists. To the antislavery
wing of the party, the pro-administration wing seemed conservative. According to recent historians, however, the pro-administration wing shared the antislavery ideology but was more cautious
about tactics. During the early stages of the conflict, these conservative and moderate Republicans joined with Democrats in
disavowing abolition as a Northern war aim.s6
Inevitably, however, Republicans came to view emancipation
as necessary to preserve the Union.s7 Emancipation began with
sporadic, unauthorized actions by army officers. In 1862, Congress took timid steps forward with the Confiscation Act, which
provided for the seizure of rebel property including slaves, and
with legislation abolishing slavery in the Territories and the District of Columbia. On September 22, 1862, Lincoln issued a preliminary proclamation, which he made final in the Emancipation
Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Lincoln was apparently motivated by a combination of tactical considerations and his longstanding antislavery beliefs. The Proclamation applied only in the
Confederacy, not in the border states.
By mid-1863, Republicans were ready to end slavery. No
longer did they disavow abolition as an independent objective of
the War.ss In their minds, slavery and rebellion had become
one.s9 Only a constitutional amendment permanently abolishing
slavery could ensure the security of the Union.9o
The thirteenth amendment prohibits slavery and "involuntary servitude," in language drawn from the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787. The amendment was debated in both Houses of Congress in the spring of 1864. It passed the Senate easily but failed
86. See J. McPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 70-71 (1964); H. BEl.Z, RECONSTRUCTING THE UNION 24-27 (1969); THE RADICAl. REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTIOI', 1861-1870, at 7 (H. Hyman ed. 1967).
87. H. BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF fREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREEDMEI''S RIGHTS, 1861-1866, at 3, 49-50 (1976).
88. J. McPHERSON, "The Ballot and Land for the freedmen," in RECONSTRUCTION:
AN ANTHOLOGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS 132 (K. Stampp & L. Litwack, eds. 1969).
89. See CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1201 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Wilson): id.
at 2948 (remarks of Rep. Shannon); id. at 2988 (remarks of Rep. Arnold); rd. at 1313 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1321 (remarks of Sen. Wilson); id. at 1461 (remarks of Sen.
Henderson); id. at 2615 (remarks of Rep. Morris).
90. As Senator Trumbull noted, slaves could be emancipated under the war power.
but slavery could only be abolished permanently by means of a constitutional amendment.
See CONG. GLOBE. 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1314 (1864).
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to obtain a two-thirds majority in the House. It then became an
issue in the presidential campaign of 1864, with Lincoln vigorously backing the amendment. After Lincoln's victory, the
amendment passed in the next session of the House.
The debates on the amendment reveal the continuity of antislavery thought. As before the war, the slave power theory played
a major part in the opposition to slavery. In opening the Senate
debate, Trumbull attributed all the Union's problems to the failure of slavery to disappear as the framers had expected and to the
Slavocracy's demand for control of the nation.9t Wilson too emphasized the expansionism of the slave power, which had aggressively sought to extend slavery into the territories.n
Like the pre-war antislavery Republicans, members of the
Thirty-eighth Congress stressed the impact of slavery on the rights
of non-slaves. As Trumbull noted in his introductory remarks,
slavery had brought about a denial of freedom of speech and the
press in half the Union.93 Senator Wilson cataloged the evils that
slavery had caused: violent attacks on abolitionists, gag orders in
Congress, seizure of colored seamen in the South, and assaults on
those who attempted to defend them.94
Once again, Republicans invoked the Declaration of Independence. Listen to Reverdy Johnson, a clear-headed constitutional lawyer not normally given to flights of rhetoric:
We mean that the Governmeut in future shall be as it has been in the past .... an
example of human freedom for the light and example of the world. and illustrating in the blessings and the happiness it confers the truth of the principles incorporated into the Declaration of Independence, that life and liberty are man's
inalienable right95

Trumbull, another down-to-earth moderate with little penchant
for rhetoric, noted the inconsistency between the Declaration,
which proclaimed "the equal rights of all to life, liberty, and happiness," and the denial of "liberty, happiness, and life itself to a
91. !d. at 1313 (1864).
92. /d. at 1320. Similar views were stated in the House. !d. at 2979 (remarks of Rep.
Farnsworth): 1d. at 1368 (remarks of Sen. Clark): CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong .. 2d Sess. 138
( 1865) (remarks of Rep. Ashley) ("irrepressible conflict").
93. CONG. GLOBE. 38th Cong .. 1st Sess. 1313 (1864).
94. /d. at 1320-21. In the House. see 1d. at 2978-79 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth): id.
at 2984 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id. at 2990 (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll): CoNG. GLOBE.
38th Cong., 2d Sess. 138, 143 ( 1845), (remarks of Rep. Orth). To the same effect, see 1d.. 1st
Sess. 1439 (remarks of Sen. Harlan).
95. !d. at 1424. Other references to the Declaration can be found in Sen. Henderson's
remarks. 1d. at 1461: in Sen. Sumner's remarks. Jd. at 1482-1483: and in Rep. Orth's remarks. id., 2d Sess. 142-143 ( 1865 ).
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whole race."96
There were also more direct appeals to the higher law. Representative Ingersoll, for example, favored the amendment
because it will secure to the oppressed slave his natural and God-given rights. I
believe that the black man has certain inalienable rights. . . . I believe he has a
right to live, and live in a state of freedom. . . . He has a right to till the soil. to
earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and enjoy the rewards of his own labor.
He has a right to the endearments and enjoyment of family ties.97

Another legislator maintained that no "constitution can legalize
the enslavement of men."9s A third argued that
the municipal act upon which the right to
contravention to the law of natural justice,
'white men are bound to respect.' Theft and
lative authority. cannot absolve man from
supreme and infallible.

property in man is predicated is in
and cannot establish a claim which
robbery. though sanctioned by legishis allegiance to that law which is

He denied "that any assembly of human law-makers ever possessed the power to create a right of property in man which we, as
men, or citizens of the Republic, are bound to respect. " 99
The longest discussions of natural law came in response to
arguments made by opponents to the amendment. Some opponents argued that the amendment clause of the Constitution did
not extend to slavery. For example, one opponent argued that the
proposed amendment struck at property, which the government
lacked the right to destroy. Abolition of slavery, he claimed,
would violate the natural law of property.wo
A few of the amendment's supporters answered that the
amendment's power was simply not limited by natural law. 101 But
the more common response was that the amendment did not destroy a vested property right because slavery itself violated natural
law.1o2 One supporter argued that God gave man no right to
property in man, only in things. Another contended that property
in slaves "exists only by the laws of the States" in which it is
found, but "has no warrant in nature; it finds no sanctions in the
enumeration of the subject of property over which dominion was
given to man by the Creator. . . . [l]ts origin is human and not
96. !d .. lst Sess. 1313 (1864).
97. /d. at 2990 (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll).
98. /d .. 2d Sess. 138 (1865). For other general references to natural law. see id. at
142-43 (remarks of Rep. Orth), id. at 154-55 (remarks of Rep. Davis).
99. /d. at 484.
100. /d .. lst Sess. 2940-41 ( 1864). See also id. at 2952 (remarks of Rep. Coffroath): id ..
2d Sess. 151 (remarks of Rep. Rogers).
101. See id .. lst Sess. 2943 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Higby): id. at 2980 (remarks of
Rep. Thayer).
102. /d. at 2978.
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divine."I03
The amendment's opponents also taunted Republicans with
the question whether the Constitution could be amended to establish slavery in free states.I04 This drew heated responses. Representative Broomall gave this answer:
[T]here are some things that are not within the limits of human legislation. It is
not within the limits of human laws to legislate away the soul of man; we cannot
deprive him, by any process of legislation, constitutional or otherwise, of his free
agency; we cannot legislate away his liberty. No man can sell himself. Hence no
man can empower his Government to sell him. lOS

A colleague admitted that such an amendment would be a law
but, being "opposed to the inalienable rights of the people of the
United States," it would be "if I may use a contradictory expression, an unlawful law, a law which you could not enforce, a law
contravening the inalienable rights of the citizens of this country." 106 To the same effect, others said that it would violate the
higher law, and, as one put it, "any human law that conflicts with
the laws of God should be pronounced of no binding force by our
courts." 101
These debates reveal the continued adherence of large segments of the Republican party to higher law doctrines. They
viewed slavery as a violation of fundamental rights, which at last
they had the power to correct through positive legislation. Obviously they hoped that after abolition of slavery these fundamental
rights would no longer be suppressed. Events were to show, however, that abolition did not suffice to bring true freedom for
blacks. Congress was then faced with providing protection for the
fundamental rights whose existence they had already recognized.
B

Reconstruction began when the army found it necessary to
govern conquered areas in the South. In December, 1863, Lincoln
established a procedure for Southern states to reenter the Union.
New state governments would be organized when ten percent of
the voters had taken a loyalty oath and adopted a state constitution renouncing secession and accepting emancipation. Congress
103. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 484 (1865) (Rep. Smithers); id at 217. A
similar natural law view of property was expressed by Senator Harlan. See id., 1st Sess.
1437 (1864).
104. See, e.g., id., 2d Sess. 222 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Pendleton).
105. !d. at 220 (1865).
106. /d. at 222. (remarks of Rep. Thayer).
107. /d. at 486.
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would retain only the power to decide when to seat Southern
representatives.
Congress responded with the Wade-Davis Bill, in which it
attempted to gain greater control of reconstruction. The bill required more stringent loyalty oaths and placed additional restrictions on the new state constitutions as a condition on
representation in Congress. Although Lincoln pocket-vetoed the
bill, Congress continued to assert its authority in reconstruction
matters. It created the Freedmen's Bureau to provide protection
for blacks and other refugees in the South, and declined to seat
representatives of the Banks government in Louisiana.
When the war ended, Republicans were confident that restoration of the Southern states could be achieved without any national guarantees other than the thirteenth amendment. Even the
assassination of Lincoln did not immediately dim their optimism.
For when Andrew Johnson assumed office he was not viewed as
an implacable foe of the Congressional Republicans.1os
When Johnson announced his reconstruction plan, however,
it became clear that he would take an extremely conservative position. The Republican euphoria of the immediate postwar period
began to wane with the implementation of Johnson's program.
The governments created under the plan were dominated by leading rebels.
Even more disturbing were the widely publicized reports of
the proposed Southern black codes. These codes prohibited
blacks from renting land, provided for the seizure of those who
breached labor contracts, prohibited servants from leaving their
masters' premises, and authorized the hiring out of black children
and of blacks unable to pay vagrancy fines. The codes also made
certain conduct criminal only when done by blacks. Republicans
considered the codes attempts to deprive the North of the fruits of
victory by reimposing slavery in a more subtle form. Republicans
now believed that additional guarantees were needed.
When the Thirty-ninth Congress convened, the moderate
Republicans who were in control immediately began to devise a
reconstruction plan that they thought would be acceptable to
Johnson and the public. Congress established a Joint Committee
on Reconstruction to coordinate consideration of the issue. The
most immediate fruit of the Republican consensus regarding the
108. Indeed, at that time, even the radical wing of the Party appears to have viewed
him as an ally. SeeK. STAMPP, ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION (1965); M. BENEDICT, A CoMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863!869, at 219-20 (1974).
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need for federal protection of blacks and loyal Southern whites
was passage of the second Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil
Rights Bill. The primary purpose of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill
was to extend the bureau's life. It also made some attempt to provide land for the freedmen as well as protection for their civil
rights.
President Johnson shocked moderates with his veto of the
Freedmen's Bureau Bill. His veto message denied Congress's
power to pass any such bill in peacetime and seemed to indicate
that peace had arrived. Congressional moderates were now under
intense pressure to take some action to get reconstruction moving
again. Their response was to push through the Civil Rights
Bill.109
When the Civil Rights Bill first came up for debate, section I
contained four provisions. First, blacks were declared to be citizens of the United States. Second, the bill prohibited "discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any
State or territory" on account of race. Third, all inhabitants were
to have the same rights to contract, to sue, and to engage in various real estate and personal property transactions. Fourth, all inhabitants were to have "full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property" and were to
be subject to the same punishments.Iw As amended, the bill
passed the Senate on February 2, 1866.
The most important subsequent change took place at the initiative of Representative Bingham. On March 8, he moved to
have the general prohibition on "discrimination in civil rights or
immunities" struck from the bill. He believed that Congress
lacked power to pass the bill. His proposed changes would leave
the bill invalid but make it "less objectionable." Essentially, his
argument was that the term "civil rights" was too vague. 111 On
March 13, when the House resumed consideration of the bill,
Representative Wilson agreed on behalf of the committee to strike
the general no-discrimination clause. He explained that the
change did not materially affect the bill, but "some gentlemen
were apprehensive that the words we propose to strike out might
give warrant for a latitudinarian construction not intended." 112
The committee had previously made several other amendments,
109.
I 10.
Ill.
112.

On these events, see M. BENEDICT, supra note 108, at 155-56, 162.
/d. at 148.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866).
/d. at 1366.
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the most important of which was to limit the bill's protections to
citizens.
President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Bill, contending
that it invaded the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.ID Although
Johnson had retained some party support after vetoing the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, the reaction was far more severe when he vetoed the Civil Rights Bill. In a mood of great emotionalism,
Congress overrode the veto.
The debates over the Civil Rights Bill and the Freedman's
Bureau Bill are couched in different terms from the earlier arguments about the thirteenth amendment. While many Republicans
observed that the bills were designed to protect natural rights belonging to all human beings, they more often referred to these
rights as belonging to United States citizens. 114 Republicans continued to believe that all men possessed natural rights. But they
had always distinguished between whether a state was violating
natural law and whether the federal government had the power to
do anything about it. In adopting the Civil Rights Bill, what
Republicans needed was not a source of human rights, but a justification for federal intervention to protect those rights against
state abridgement.IIS Many cited the thirteenth amendment, on
the theory that the rights set forth in the bill were inherent in the
freedom guaranteed by the amendment. 116 Opponents replied
that the thirteenth amendment only authorized Congress to abolish slavery.111 In turn, the Republicans responded by arguing that
113. /d. at 1679.
114. References to natural rights can, however, still be found in the debates. See. e.g ..
CoN G. GLOBE. 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-76 ( 1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); Jd. at 1124
(remarks of Rep. Cook); id. at 1159 (remarks of Rep. Windom); td. at 1157 (remarks of
Rep. Thornton); id. at 1832-33 (remarks of Rep. Lawrence); td. at 632 (remarks of Rep.
Moulton); id. at 744 (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
Some two years later, Congress considered a bill relating to expatriation. The legislative history is replete with natural law references. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong .• 2d Sess.
968. 1130 ( 1868) (remarks of Rep. Butler); Jd. at 969 (remarks of Rep. Judd); td. at 1100-0 I.
1159 (remarks of Rep. Baker); id. at 1101 (remarks of Rep. Ashley); id. at 1105 (remarks of
Rep. Clarke); id. at 1130-31 (remarks of Rep. Woodbridge); id. at 1797-1798, 2316 (remarks
of Rep. Banks); id. at 1797 (preamble of bill: "right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people"); id. at 1800-1804 (remarks of Rep. Van Trump); id. at 4211 (remarks of Sen. Howard); td. at 4233-4234 (remarks of Sen. Morton).
115. The Freedmen's Bureau Bill could be justified as an exercise of the war power.
As Belz says, the controversies in passing the Civil Rights Act were not over the content of
rights. which Republicans agreed on. but over whether rights should be protected by the
state or federal government. See H. BELZ, supra note 87, at 162, 166 (note that Belz's list of
rights includes the family and religion).
116. See, e.g .• CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Sherman); id. at 39 (remarks of Sen. Wilson); id. at 475 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); td. at 1124
(remarks of Rep. Cook); id. at 1152 (remarks of Rep. Thayer).
117. Whether the thirteenth amendment in fact provided authority to pass the Civil
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all governments have the duty, and therefore the inherent power,
to protect the fundamental rights of their citizens.
In considering this arguments, it is important to keep in mind
the changes the Civil War had made in constitutional thinking.
The Constitution, after all, said nothing about secession, or about
waging civil war, or about reconstructing a defeated South. Strict
constructionists believed that the North was puwerless to do any
of these things.JIB But fortunately, the Republicans were not strict
constructionists. During the war they had come to believe that the
national government's powers were congruent with the nation's
needs.ll9 The Civil War had called for unprecedented actions by
the President and Congress. By the end of the war, Republicans
were accustomed to being able to find some source of constitutional authority for whatever actions they thought necessary.
The Civil War also drastically changed prevailing views
about the relationship between the individual citizen and the national government. Before the war, the states were primarily responsible for meeting the basic needs of American citizens, while
the national government had little impact on the daily lives of
most Americans. Consequently, state citizenship was considered
paramount. From this premise, it was a small step to the conclusion that allegiance to the state came before allegiance to the federal government. But such concepts obviously could not survive
the Civil War, a war for the primary allegiance of the citizen.12o
Both the expansion of national power and the growing significance of national allegiance became evident early in the war. In
the Prize Cases,121 the Supreme Court was required to determine
Rights Bill is a much mooted question. It does appear that Republicans optimistically
believed that the abolition of slavery would bring about a state of freedom for blacks.
118. See D. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861. 520 (1976). If he had been
on the scene, Raoul Berger presumably would have taken this position. Berger argues that
limits on the states can be imposed only if there is a "clear showing" of a specific intention
in the Constitution, see, e.g .. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 17-18. 137 n.l7
(1977), and he generally believes that the Constitution should be limited strictly by its
framers' specific intent. SeeR. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 27-28; 77-79, 89, 102 n.ll7
(1982). Since the Constitution nowhere expressly prohibits a state from seceding and nowhere expressly authorizes the federal government to resist secession, Berger seems logically committed to the position that the North wrongfully fought the Civil War.
119. As Fessenden said about the Freedmen's Bureau bill, "the power may be found
when the positive necessity of the thing is apparent." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong .. 1st Sess.
366 (1866). This theme was prevalent throughout the war. For examples during debates
over the Confiscation Act of 1862, see CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2293 (1862)
(remarks of Rep. Wallace); id. at 1075 (remarks of Sen. Morrill).
120. See Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978
SUP. CT. REV. 39, 41; J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: 1608!870, at 334-42 (1978).
121. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862). The quoted passages are found in id. at 669, 674
and 673, respectively.
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not only the president's power to impose a blockade, but also the
relationship of Southerners to the federal government after the
outbreak of war. The Court strongly affirmed presidential power
to react to the emergency without waiting for congressional approval or a declaration of war. When war broke out, "[t]he President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without
waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given
to it by him or them could change the fact." As to the status of
citizens in the South, the Court said, "[t]hey have cast off their
allegiance and made war on their Government, and are none the
less enemies because they are traitors." In an affirmation of nationalism, the Court also said that citizens owe "supreme allegiance" to the federal government and only "qualified allegiance"
to their state.
Congress was also greatly concerned about questions of citizenship and allegiance. The 1862 Confiscation Act provided a
new punishment for treason and created the lesser crime of giving
aid to the rebellion. Throughout the debates Republicans characterized the rebels as traitors who could be punished for their "broken allegiance." One senator noted that the leading rebels,
"having betrayed, are no further entitled to the protection of the
Government"; another said that only "those who were true to
their allegiance" were entitled to property rights.122 The importance attached to citizenship and allegiance is also evidenced by
the frequent resort to loyalty oaths, particularly in the Confiscation Act and the Wade-Davis Bill. The Wade-Davis Bill also
stripped certain classes of Confederate office-holders of their
United States citizenship. Finally, Congress itself provided that
Southern congressmen-elect would have to take an iron-clad oath
of past loyalty to the Union.
Given the emotional significance of allegiance and the expansion of national power during the war, it is not surprising that
Republicans used the concept of national citizenship to justify
their support of the Civil Rights Bill. They had little difficulty
connecting the natural rights they sought to protect with national
citizenship. Indeed, they argued that the comity clause in the
original Constitution had already established this connection. Article IV, section 2 provides that "the citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of citizens in the several
States." Republicans interpreted the clause as if it said, "the citi122. CoNG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2299 (1862) (remarks of Rep. Blair); id. at
1077; id. at 1881.
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zens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens [of the United States] in the several states."
They found support for this reading in some pre-Civil War
cases, notably Coifield v. Corye/1.123 In Coifield, Justice Washington had said that the comity clause protects "those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong,
of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at
all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states. . . . "
Among these rights were "[p]rotection by the goverment; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole."
There are several examples of this interpretation of the comity clause in the debates on the thirteenth amendment, 124 and it
also figured prominently in the debates on the Civil Rights Bill.
Senator Trumbull referred to the comity clause to demonstrate
that
the rights of a citizen of the United States were certain great fundamental rights,
such as the right to life, to liberty, and to avail one's self of all the laws passed for
the benefit of the citizen to enable him to enforce his rights; inasmuch as this was
the definition given to the term as applied in that part of the Constitution, I reasoned from that, that when the Constitution had been amended and slavery abolished. and we were about to pass a law declaring every person, no matter of what
color, born in the United States a citizen of the United States, the same rights
would then appertain to all persons who were clothed with American
citizenship. 12 5

In the House, Representative Wilson argued that the rights protected in the bill were not new because they were already contained in the comity clause as construed in Coifield. That clause
represented a "general citizenship" which "entitles every citizen to
security and protection of personal rights." He argued that the
bill protected rights belonging to "citizens of the United States, as
123. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 551-552, (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) No. 3,230;seea/so Douglas v. Stephens, I Del. Ch. 465,469-74,477-78 (1821); J. KETTNER, supra note 120, at 258-260.323,
348. Corjield is close to the Supreme Court's current view of the comity clause, which also
uses a fundamental rights analysis. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v.
Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300-06 (2d ed. 1983).
124. See CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong .. 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Wilson)
(right of free speech belongs to every American citizen and is protected by the comity
clause); id., 2d Sess. 139 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Ashley). Prominent Republicans had
relied on the comity clause as a grant of rights of national citizenship even earlier. See H.
BELZ. supra note 87, at 27-29, 119-20, 164-65.
125. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 600 (1866). See also id. at 476 (bill protects
"fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man"). Trumbull used somewhat
similar language in connection with the Freedman's Bureau Bill. See id. at 319, 322.
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such."126 Representative Lawrence responded to the President's
veto with a lengthy defense of the bill. He maintained that Congress had the power to secure citizens "in the enjoyment of their
inherent right of life, liberty, and property," and "to enforce [the
comity clause] and the equal civil rights which it recognizes or by
implication affirms to exist among citizens of the same State." After a discussion of some of the cases and writers dealing with the
comity clause, he concluded that it embodies "equal fundamental
civil rights for all citizens." m
Another concept also played an important role in the debates.
Natural law and law-of-nations thinkers had stressed that citizens
owe allegiance to their government in exchange for the government's grant of protection to them. Thus, one of the most important rights of citizenship is the right to receive such protection.
Early in the debates on the Civil Rights Act, Senator Johnson
raised this argument:
If I am right . . . that we can authorize (blacks] to sue, authorize them to contract,
authorize them to do everything short of voting, it is not because there is anything
in the Constitution of the United States that confers the authority to give to a
negro the right to contract, but it is because it is a necessary, incidental function of
a Government that it should have authority to provide that the rights of everybody within its limits shall be protected, and protected alike. t28

He concluded that it "would have been a disgrace to the members
of the [Constitutional] Convention" if they had foreseen the abolition of slavery and "had denied to the Congress of the United
States the authority to pass laws for the protection of all the rights
incident to the condition of a free man."
A similar argument was made in the House by Representative Broomall. He first noted that it was a "strange" view that the
government could protect its citizens abroad but not at home. He
found such a power in the general welfare clause and in the necessary and proper clause. Then he made a more sweeping
argument:
/d. at 1117-18, 1294.
/d. at 1835-1836. See also id. at 1263 (remarks by Rep. Broomall) (listing free
speech as one of the "rights and immunities of citizens"); id. at 1266 (remarks of Rep.
Raymond) {listing "right to bear arms" as a right of citizens); id. at 1293-1294 {remarks of
Rep. Shellabarger) {right of petition is an "indispensable" right of citizenship). Another
purported source of rights was the fifth amendment. See id. at 1152, 1270 (remarks of Rep.
Thayer); id. at 1294 {remarks of Rep. Wilson). Cf. id. at 1157 (remarks of Rep. Thornton);
id. at 340 (remarks of Sen. Cowan). There were also citations to the thirteenth amendment. See, e.g., id. at 1152 (remarks of Rep. Thayer); id. at App. 157 {remarks of Rep.
Wilson).
128. !d. at 530. See also Johnson's expostulation in response to a contrary argument
by Senator Henderson, id. at 572, as well as Senator Morrill's statement, id. at 570 (allegiance and protection the essential elements of citizenship).
126.
127.
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But throwing aside the letter of the Constitution, there are characteristics of
Governments that belong to them as such, without which they would cease to be
Governments. The rights and duties of allegiance and protection are corresponding rights and duties . . . . [Wherever] I owe allegiance to my country. there it
owes me protection. and wherever my Government owes me no protection I owe
it no allegiance and can commit no treason.

Broomall attacked the idea that such protection could be left to
the states, inasmuch as "everybody knows that the rights and immunities of citizens were habitually and systematically denied in
certain States to the citizens of other States: the right of speech,
the right of transit, the right of domicile, the right to sue, the writ
of habeas corpus, and the right of petition." He also argued that
the necessity for the bill was not limited to the black man, since
loyal whites were being denied their basic rights in the South. t2 9
Representative Wilson made one of the most forceful arguments based on the duty to protect. In his view, the rights protected by the Civil Rights Bill were "simply the absolute rights of
individuals" or "the natural rights of man." He contended that
the bill did not establish new rights, but instead protected and enforced those which already belonged to every citizen. In his opinion, the comity clause entitled every citizen to federal protection
of personal rights:
I reassert that the possession of these rights by the citizen raises by necessary
implication the power in Congress to protect them. If a citizen of the United
States should go abroad, and while within the jurisdiction of a foreign Power be
despoiled of his rights of personal security, personal liberty. or personal property
contrary to the due course of law of the nation inflicting the wrong. this Government would espouse his cause and enforce redress even to the extremity of war .
. . Well. if all the terrible powers of war may be resorted to for the protection of the rights of our citizens when those rights are disregarded and trampled
on beyond our jurisdiction, is it possible that our Constitution is so defective that
we have no power under it to protect our citizens within our own jurisdiction
through the peaceful means of statutes and courts~
Under this broad principle I rest my justification of this bill. I assert that we
possess the power to do those things which Governments are organized to do; that
we may protect the citizen of the United States against a violation of his rights by
the law of a single State; . . . that this power permeates our whole system. is a
part of it. without which the States can run riot over every fundamental right
belonging to citizens of the United States; that the right to exercise this power
depends upon no express delegation, but runs with the rights it is designed to
protect. .. I30

129. /d. at 1263-64.
130. !d. at 1117-19. Wilson reiterated essentially the same argument. /d. at App. 157
and ld. at 1294. See also. id. at 1293 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). In a similar vein. see
1d. at 632 (remarks of Rep. Hubbard on the Freedman's Bureau Bill); ld. at 654 (remarks of
Rep. McKee).
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After President Johnson's veto, Trumbull made a major
speech in the Senate defending the bill against Johnson's charges.
He asserted that
[t]o be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; . . . They are
those inherent, fundamental rights which belong to free citizens or free men in all
countries, such as the rights enumerated in this bill, and they belong to them in all
the States of the Union. The right of American citizenship means something.

Trumbull stated that citizens are entitled to protection within the
States as well as abroad. He contended that the rights of life, liberty and property are "inalienable rights, belonging to every citizen of the United States, as such, no matter where he may be;"
American citizenship "would have little worth" if it did not carry
protection with it.
How is it that every person born in these United States owes allegiance to the
Government? Everything that he is or has. his propeny and his life, may be taken
by the Government of the United States in its defense ... and can it be that ...
we have got a Government which is all-powerful to command the obedience of
the citizen, but has no power to alford him protectionry Is that all that this boasted
American citizenship amounts to? . . . Sir, it cannot be. Such is not the meaning
of our Constitution. Such is not the meaning of American citizenship. This Government, which would go to war to protect its meanest-! will not say citizeninhabitant ... in any foreign land whose rights were unjustly encroached upon.
has cenainly some power to protect its own citizens in their own country. Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights. 131

Senator Johnson responded to Trumbull's arguments with a line
of reasoning that probably would have been regarded as convincing prior to the Civil War. Trumbull's theory, he contended.
begged the question-it was the business of the federal government to protect its citizens, but only with respect to matters within
federal jurisdiction.132
In the House, Representative Lawrence responded to the
President's veto by asserting that the bill protected rights "recognized by the Constitution as existing anterior to and independently of all laws and all constitutions." It was, he maintained,
"idle to say that a citizen shall have the right to life, yet to deny
him the right to labor, whereby alone he can live." More, "[i]t is
worse than mockery to say that men may be clothed by the national authority with the character of citizens, yet may be stripped
by State authority of the means by which citizens may exist." In
his view, "Congress has the incidental power to enforce and protect the equal enjoyment in the States of civil rights which are
131.
132.

/d. at 1757.
/d. at 1777.
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inherent in national citizenship." I33
Although Senator Johnson's argument was technically
stronger, his opponents' arguments were politically irresistible.
The nation had fought a civil war to establish the primary allegiance of citizens to the federal government. In fighting that war,
the government had sent thousands of men, many of them draftees, to their deaths. The South was still essentially an occupied
territory. A government that had required such sacrifices from its
citizens could not be denied the power to protect their most fundamental rights.

c
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, despite its enormous
importance today, was the subject of relatively little debate in
Congress. This has always puzzled scholars. Some have concluded that the brevity of the debate indicates that the amendment
was designed to create only an extremely narrow set of rights. We
believe, on the contrary, that the debates were short because the
fourteenth amendment was intended to create no rights at all.
Republicans generally believed that fundamental rights already
existed, at least as a matter of natural law and the law of nations,
and that Congress probably already possessed the power to protect these rights. The fourteenth amendment was merely designed
to perfect that protection. It would ensure a secure constitutional
basis for congressional action and provide a self-executing restraint on the states. The nature and source of these rights had
been discussed by Republicans since the party was formed in the
1850's, and had received intensive consideration in Congress at
least since the debates on the thirteenth amendment. Congressmen felt little need to reiterate what had already been discussed
for so many years.I34
133. /d. at 1832-35. 2 J. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 177-178 (1886).
quotes an impassioned speech by Trumbull:
It cannot be that we have constituted a government . . . which is all-powerful to
command the obedience of the citizen but has no power to afford him protection . . . . Tell it not. sir . . . . to the father whose son was starved at Andersonville. or the widow whose husband was slain at Mission Ridge. or the little boy
who leads his sightless father through the streets of your city. or the thousand
other mangled heroes to be seen on every side of us to-day. that this Government.
in defense of which the son and the husband fell. the father lost his sight and the
others were maimed and crippled. had the right to call these persons to its defense, but now has no power to protect the survivors or their friends in any rights
whatever in the States. Such, sir, is not the meaning of our Constitution; such is
not the meaning of American citizenship. Allegiance and protection are reciprocal rights.
134. See H. BELZ, supra note 87, at 172.
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Before the House took up the Civil Rights Bill, it had considered a proposed constitutional amendment of Representative
Bingham's, which provided:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty. and property.135

Bingham called attention to the fact that the proposal used existing constitutional language except for the portion conferring
power on Congress. The remainder, he said, was in the comity
clause and the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The
majority view among Republicans was that Congress already had
the power to protect these rights. Bingham, however, disagreed.
He believed that under the original Constitution, enforcement
rested solely with state officers, who were obligated by their oaths
to protect these rights. In a later speech, he made it clear that the
amendment was intended to protect loyal white citizens whose
property had been confiscated in the South, and also to apply to
"other States . . . that have in their constitutions and laws to-day
provisions in direct violation of every principle of our
Constitution." t36
Debate on Bingham's proposal was brief. Its supporters argued variously that the national government already had the
power to defend the rights of citizens but that the amendment
would remove any doubts; that it would give Congress the power
to enforce only the original comity clause; and that it merely gave
Congress power to protect "the natural rights which necessarily
pertain to citizenship."t37
Bingham denied that the provision deprived any state of its
rights. Rather, it simply would arm Congress with the power to
enforce "the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution to-day."
He then quoted the comity clause and the fifth amendment. He
derided the notion that any state had reserved to itself the power
to deny these rights, which he said were "universal and independent of all local State legislation" and "belong, by the gift of God,"
to all. He found it anomalous that the federal government had
power to vindicate the rights of citizens abroad, but not the power
in peacetime to enforce those rights at home. In response to an
attack by Representative Hale, Bingham seemed unclear about
135.
136.
137.

Co!'G. GLOBE. 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 1033-34 (1866). See also id. at 1292.
/d. at 1065.
!d. at 1062-63 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id. at 1066 (remarks of Rep. Price); td. at

1088 (remarks of Rep. Woodbridge).
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whether his proposal would give Congress the police power or
merely power to ensure that states treated all their citizens alike
with respect to protection of fundamental rights.Bs
Representative Hotchkiss then took the floor. He explained
that he would vote to postpone consideration of the amendment
until it could be modified. In his view, Congress might someday
fall into the control of the former rebels. Basic rights should not
be wholly relegated to Congressional control but should also be
directly protected by the Constitution:
This amendment provides that Congress may pass laws to enforce these rights.
Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution that no State shall discriminate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as a part
of the organic law of the land, subject only to be defeated by another constitutional amendment. We may pass laws here to-day, and the next Congress may
wipe them out.l39

Representative Conkling then moved to postpone consideration of
the measure, and this passed with virtually all Republicans (including Bingham) voting in favor.
On April 9, 1866, the House overrode the president's veto
and the Civil Rights Bill became law. On April 21, Representative Stevens placed before the Joint Committee a reconstruction
plan proposed by Robert Owen. One aspect was a proposed constitutional amendment. After some maneuvering in committee,
Bingham was successful in having the original language of the
proposal replaced by his own formulation:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.

This language was quite similar to that contained in Bingham's
earlier proposal. The significant difference was that the earlier
proposal was couched as a grant of congressional power; the new
one was phrased as a limitation on state power. Bingham said
138. /d. at 1088-94. Bingham's ambivalence on this issue was shared by many others.
While the moderate Republicans who sponsored the fourteenth amendment understood
the need to make some modifications in federalism, they had not lost their respect for the
autonomy of the states. See, e.g., H. BELz, supra note 87, at 158-59. They assumed that the
state governments would protect the fundamental rights of some citizens, at least the most
favored classes of whites. Thus, if only the states would furnish the same protection to the
rights of others, such as blacks, there would be no need for federal intervention. See Benedict. Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J.
AM. HIST. 65, 78-83 (1974); BELZ, supra, at 164-65, 167. When federal intervention did
take place, it wo~ld be limited to the protection of fundamental rights. Thus, they hoped,
federal mterventwn would be only occasional and limited in its scope. H. BELZ, supra, at
131-34, 173-74.
139. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
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that the change was motivated by his reading of Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Barron v. Baltimore .l4D He explained that
the privileges and immunities he had in mind were largely defined
in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.l41
Most of the debate on the fourteenth amendment concerned
the now-forgotten provisions of sections 2 and 3. Moderate
Republicans were apparently not yet prepared to mandate black
suffrage. As a substitute, they proposed a three-part solution to
the problem of protecting the blacks. Section 1 would ensure protection for fundamental civil rights, presumably excluding suffrage. Section 2 would reduce Southern representation in the
House to the extent that Southern states denied blacks the right to
vote. Section 3 would compensate for a possible lack of black suffrage by imposing political disabilities on Confederate supporters.
Despite the focus on other sections, some significant statements were made about section 1 in the House. In opening the
debate, Representative Stevens noted that the provisions of section 1 were "all asserted, in some form or other, in our DECLARATION or organic law." But the Constitution had limited only
the power of Congress rather than that of the states; this amendment supplied the missing limitation.l42 Representative Garfield,
the next supporter of the amendment to speak, expressed regret
that it did not provide for suffrage, for he believed "that the right
to vote, . . . is so necessary to the protection of . . . natural rights
as to be indispensable, and therefore equal to natural rights."l43
The next speaker noted that the amendment merely brought into
the Constitution "what is found in the bill of rights of every State
of the Union" and incorporated the principle of the Civil Rights
Act into the Constitution.l44 Several others noted that they had
supported the Civil Rights Act and believed it to be constitutional,
but were supporting the amendment to remove any possible
doubts.l45 Some referred to the Declaration of Independence as
140. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 ( 1833).
141. See J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 104-06 (1956).
142. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong .• 1st Sess. 2459 ( 1866) (capitals in original). Similarly.
in a speech made while the amendment was before the county. Representative Schenck
said it put into the Constitution "those principles of liberty and equality which were understood to be in the Constitution . . . by those who framed it." Cincinnati Commercial, Aug.
20. 1866, at 2. col. 5. In another such speech, Gen. Rutherford Hayes spoke of the duty of
the United States, in return for the allegiance of the citizen, "to hold up before him the
broad shield of the Constitution." /d., Sept 8, 1866, at 2, col. 4.
143. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866).
144. /d. at 2465.
145. !d. at 2498 (remarks of Rep. Broomall); id. at 2468 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id.
at 2502 (remarks of Rep. Raymond); td. at 2511 (remarks of Rep. Eliot).
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the source of the rights protected by the amendment.t46
Near the close of the debates on section I, Representative
Bingham took the floor. He explained that the purpose of the
amendment was to give Congress power "to protect by national
law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person in its jurisdiction."I47 As
before, he maintained that the amendment took from the states no
power that had ever been rightfully theirs. Shortly afterwards, the
House passed the joint resolution proposing the constitutional
amendment.
On May 23, the Senate began consideration of the proposed
amendment. Since the Senate Chairman of the Joint Committee
was ill, the joint resolution was presented by Senator Howard. As
to the privileges and immunities clause, he said it would be "a
curious question to solve what are the privileges and immunities
of citizens of each of the States in the several States." He then
quoted at length from Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v.
Coryell, which had given a fundamental rights interpretation to
the comity clause. Howard then continued that these privileges
and immunities "are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature . . . . " To those undefined privileges and immunities under the comity clause, he said, must be
added the rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution, which he enumerated. He noted, for example, that
the restriction against taking private property without just compensation applied only to Congress, not to the states. Under the
existing Constitution, Congress had no power to enforce the Bill
of Rights. The proposed amendment would provide an affirmative source of power to protect these rights. Howard spoke only
briefly about the equal protection clause, saying it would abolish
all "class legislation in the States and [do] away with the injustice
of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to
another." t4s
After the Senate debate on May 23, Republican senators met
in caucus about the proposed constitutional amendment. The
joint resolution came before the Senate again on May 29. As a
result of the caucus, amendments were made to sections 2 and 3,
and the citizenship clause was added to section I. Senator Howard explained that in his view the fourteenth amendment was
146. See Jd. at 2510 (remarks of Rep. Miller); 1d. at 2539 (remarks of Rep.
Farnsworth).
147. /d. at 2542.
148. /d. at 2765-66.
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"simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United
States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law
and national law a citizen of the United States." 149
After the caucus amendments were passed by party vote, significant Senate debate virtually ended, apparently because Senate
Republicans had resolved their differences in secret caucus. At
various points in the brief remaining debate, references were
made to the reciprocal nature of allegiance and protection, as well
as to the fundamental rights protected by the comity clause.1so
The most important question raised by the debates is what
rights the amendment was to protect. The legislative history
shows that these rights at least included those fundamental rights
described in the Coryell opinion and protected by the Civil Rights
Bill. It was, after all, one purpose of the amendment to make the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill clear. On the other hand,
the right to vote was probably not protected by section 1, though
many of the amendment's supporters would have liked to grant
such protection.1s1 The major speeches by Bingham and Howard
suggest that the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Quite likely, these were the men to whom
members of Congress would have turned for an interpretation of
the amendment.1s2
Howard's speech also suggests that to some extent the content
of the privileges and immunities clause was to be left to later judicial interpretation.ls3 As Representative Patterson had noted in
the debates on the thirteenth amendment, "the English definition
of justice and liberty in the Twelfth Century is not the definition
of the Nineteenth Century. Our interpretation of these terms in
the future of our history will vary with education and local
prejudices." 154 So perhaps the framers realized, as Bickel maintained, that the amendment's precise content in some sense was in
149. !d. at 2890.
ISO. See. e.g.. id. at 2918 (remarks of Sen. Willey); Jd. at 2919 (remarks of Sen. Davis);
id. at 2892-93 (remarks of Sen. Conness); id. at 2896 (remarks of Sen. Howard); Jd. at 2961
(remarks of Sen. Poland); Jd. at App. 219 (remarks of Sen. Howe); Jd. at 3031-35 (remarks
of Sen. Henderson). See also. id. at App. 256 (remarks of Rep. Baker); id. at App. 293
(remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
!51. See R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY. supra note 118, at 52-68.
152. See Ely. Constitutionalfnterpretavism: Its Allure and !mpossibrli~l'. supra note 85.
at 428-433.
153. Howard said that the privileges and immunities "are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature" and cited Cotjield to "gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary." CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st
Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
154. CoNG. GLOBE. 38th Cong.. 2d Sess. 484 (1865).
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the hands of future generations. In any event, thirty years of debate since Brown have failed to produce any consensus on the exact rights the framers had in mind; we see little point in
continuing the attempt to discern clues about their precise views
on a subject which they discussed so inattentively. 1ss
The entire theory behind the amendment argues against giving it an unduly crabbed interpretation.Is6 Recall that the basic
theory of the Civil Rights Act was that the federal government
had at least as much power to protect its citizens at home as it did
when they were abroad. Our government would presumably protest if American citizens abroad were punished for their political
or religious beliefs, had their property seized without compensation, or were subjected to unfair trials or cruel and unusual punishments. The general theory of the Civil Rights Act was that
Congress had the same power to protect citizens at home. Those
like Bingham, who thought that Congress did not yet have such
power, believed that the fourteenth amendment supplied the missing authority to protect basic human rights.Is7
III
In reading the voluminous statements of the Republicans,
both in the 1850's and during the Civil War and reconstruction, it
is often difficult to determine the precise import of their remarks
to legal issues of interest today. The search to find a specific, clear
155. The main thesis of Raoul Berger's work is that the privileges and immunities
clause included only the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act. See R. BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 118, at 20-36. For some responses by critics, see Dimond,
Strict Construction and Judicial Review if Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection
Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on lnterpretivist Grounds 80 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1982);
Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651
(1979); and for Berger's rebuttal arguments, see Berger, Paul Dimond Fails to 'Meet Raoul
Berger on lnterpretivist Grounds', 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 285 (1982); Berger, Incorporation of the
Bi/1 of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981 ).
We have no desire to enter into what now appears likely to become an interminable and
increasingly intemperate debate. Instead, we would offer two brief observations. First,
Berger's argument seems to be strongest when he attempts to demonstrate a specific intent
to exclude cenain specific rights such as voting, though even here the point is at least subject to dispute. See Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the 'Right' to Vote, and the
Understanding if the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 33. Second, we have
shown that, from well before the Civil War until after 1866, the Republicans clearly considered a number of other rights to be fundamental. Berger does not, in our view, carry the
burden of demonstrating an intent to exclude these other fundamental rights from the coverage of the Amendment.
156. For a strong argument in favor of giving a broad reading to the fundamentalrights guarantee of the founeenth amendment, see R. Kaczorowski, The Nationalization of
Civil Rights (Univ. of Minn. Ph.D. thesis, 1971).
157. The equal protection clause and due process clause refer to "persons" rather than
"citizens," thus providing aliens with at least some degree of protection.
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legislative intent on all the various problems of interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment is doomed to failure. But while specific intentions may have remained unclear, the overall Republican theme from 1856 to 1866 is unmistakable. Their mission,
beginning even before the formation of the Republican party itself
and continuing through reconstruction, was to bridge the gap between their views on human rights and the realities of the American legal system. Moderates and radicals were divided, not by
disagreement on this basic goal, but by considerations of tactics
and strategy.
Antislavery Republicans came to power with a well developed theory of human rights. In their view, human rights derived
from natural law and its offshoot, the law of nations. As a result
of the social compact, government was under an obligation to protect certain human rights. Among these rights were property and
freedom of speech.1ss The antislavery Republicans recognized,
however, that a state might violate this obligation by enacting legislation contrary to natural law. They did not contest the legal
validity of such legislation within the state's own boundaries.
They did maintain that such legislation was entitled to no respect
outside those boundaries, except as required by some other positive law such as the fugitive slave clause. In short, they recognized
that a gap could exist between higher law and an actual legal
system.
After the Republicans came to power, they sought to narrow
this gap. In the thirteenth amendment, they vindicated the natural rights of slaves by giving them freedom. In the Civil Rights
Act, they exercised what they believed to be the inherent power of
the federal government under the law of nations to protect the
fundamental rights of its citizens. Finally, in the fourteenth
amendment, they sought to constitutionalize this protection in two
ways. First, they sought to embody the protection in a self-executing constitutional provision. Second, they intended to remove any
possible doubts about congressional power to protect fundamental
rights.
One of the great achievements of the Republicans in the early
reconstruction period was to establish the meaning of American
citizenship. Before the Civil War, American citizenship was an
158. Belz confirms that freedom of speech was considered a civil rather than a political
right. H. BELZ, supra note 87, at xii-xiii, 157-58. A~rding to Benedict, family relationships were also consistently considered fundamental nghts by Republicans. See Bened1ct.
Equality and Expediency in the Reconstruction Era, 23 CIVIL WAR HISTORY 328 ( 1977): H.
HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT,

1835-1875, at 302 (1982).
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ill-defined and largely insignificant concept. For most purposes,
state citizenship was far more significant. The Civil War changed
all that by establishing that a citizen's primary allegiance was to
the federal government. Thus, the concept of national citizenship
became triumphant. But it was not enough simply to proclaim the
existence of citizenship, it was also necessary to give content to
that citizenship.
After the Civil Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment,
citizenship would mean more than the right to an American passport when traveling abroad. Instead, American citizenship would
be linked to the possession of fundamental rights, protected
against violation by any level of government within the United
States. The creation of American citizenship was one of the great
accomplishments of the fourteenth amendment. This accomplishment was not the result of pure political philosophy. Rather it
arose from a complex interaction between the exigencies of reconstruction and Republican political thought, which itself was a delicate accommodation between higher-law theories and political
realism.
Today, of course, the most significant question is the identity
of the fundamental rights protected by the fourteenth amendment.
History gives no clear answer. The framers were providing a
mechanism to protect rights rather than creating new rights; thus,
they had little reason to focus carefully on the identity of the
rights involved. We know they considered freedom of speech to
be fundamental, and they may well have had at least some other
parts of the Bill of Rights in mind. While the specifics are unclear,
there can be no doubt of their general intent. As a Supreme Court
Justice was to put it almost a century later, the fourteenth amendment was intended "to embrace those rights which are fundamental; which belong to the citizens of all free governments, for the
purposes of securing which men enter into society." I 59 Before the
Civil War, these rights were largely entrusted to the protection of
the states. The fourteenth amendment commemorated a new social compact. For the first time, the federal government claimed
the exclusive allegiance of its citizens, in return for its commitment to protect their fundamental rights.
. 159. Poe v. Ullman. 367 U.S. 497,541 (1961) (Harlan, J., disseming) (emphasis in origmal; mternal brackets, citations and quotation marks omitted).
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A NOTE ON SOURCES

The original version of this article contained rather exhaustive documentation. In the interest of readability-and at the cost of great mental anguish-we have pared the original
512 footnotes down to 159. Readers who would like to consult the original, more fully
documented version, are invited to write either the authors or the editors for copies of the
original manuscript and footnotes.
Instead of the original complete documentation, we have decided to present a brief
discussion of the sources which we found most helpful. We began. of course. with the
classic fourteenth amendment studies of tenBroeck, Bickel, James, and Fairman. But we
also gave close attention to numerous other sources.
On the pre-Civil War period, we relied heavily for background on D. Potter's IMPENDING CRISIS (1976) and A. Nevins's ORDEAL OF THE UNION (1947) and EMERGENCE OF
LINCOLN (1950). P. MILLER, LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA (1965), helped set the intellectual stage. A number of recent works have intensively studied the origins and rise of the
Republican party. E. Foner's FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (1970), was the single most useful source for our purposes. We
also found excellent material, however, in J. MAYFIELD, REHEARSAL FOR REPUBLICANISM
(1980); K. STAMPP, IMPERILED UNION: ESSAYS ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL WAR
(1980); R. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM (1976); H. TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS (1968); E. FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1980);
and F. BLUE, THE FREE SOlLERS (1973). Additional useful material on Republican views
was provided by H. PERKINS, NORTHERN EDITORIALS ON SECESSION (1942).
Some of the best, as well as the most readable, material on this period is found in
biographies. Among the most useful for our purposes were H. TREFoussE, BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN WADE (1963); G. VANDEUSEN, WILLIAN HENRY SEWARD (1967); D. DoNALD,
CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1960); R. SEWELL, JoHN P.
HALE AND THE POLITICS OF ABOLITION (1965); J. STEWART, JOSHUA GIDDINGS AND THE
TACTICS OF RADICAL POLITICS (1976); D. FEHRENBACHER, PRELUDE TO GREATNESS
(1962); and D. DONALD, LINCOLN'S HERNDON (1948). We also found useful material in R.
NYE, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON (1955); F. FESSENDEN, WILLIAM PITT FESSENDEN
(1907); H. MILLER, THADDEUS STEVENS (1939); H. COMMAGER, THEODORE PARKER
(1936); M. DUBERMAN, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS (1961); A. HART, SALMON PORTLAND
CHASE ( 1899); W. KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER (1960); C. Riggs, The Ante-Bellum Career of
John Bingham (1958) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis); and S. BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
AND THE UNION (1956).
There are a number of excellent recent books on ante-bellum legal thinking. D.
Fehrenbacher's THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978), and R. Cover's JusTICE AccusED (1978), played a prominent role in our
thinking. We also found useful material in W. WIECEK, SOURCES OF ANTI-SLAVERY CoNSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1977); P. PALUDAN, A CoVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CoNSTITUTION, LAW, AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1975); R. NYE, FETTERED
FREEDOMS (1949); R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON
LAW (1977); as well as Swisher's extraordinarily good volume on the Taney Court in the
Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court. We also consulted treatises by Kent, Story,
Sedgwick, Wheaton, Rawle and Lieber. As background, we sampled the literature on the
social contract theorists and natural law theory prior to the American Revolution. but we
certainly claim no expertise in this area.
On the role of natural law thinking in American law, the classic references are C.
HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930); B. WRIGHT, AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1931); and Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L.
REV. 366 (1911). Nelson's articles, including his study of the impact of antislavery thought
on styles of judicial reasoning, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974), are also quite useful.
The literature on reconstruction is enormous. We relied primarily on the following
works: M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE (1974); H. HYMAN, NEW FRONTIERS
OF AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION (1966); L. Cox & D. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND
PREJUDICE, 1865-1866 ( 1963); E. McKITTRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON & RECONSTRUCTION
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(1960); K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION {1965); K. STAMPP & L. LITWACK,
RECONSTRUCTION (1969); H. BELZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE UNION: THEORY AND POLICY
DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1969); T. WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965); H.
HYMAN, A MoRE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION (1973); H. Belz, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND FREEDMEN'S RIGHTS, 1861 TO 1866 (1976); H. BELZ, EMANCIPATION Ar-oD
EQUAL RIGHTS; POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1978); D.
Dor-oALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN ( 1970); H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK,
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875 ( 1982); and H.
HYMAN, RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION (1967). Helpful background was
provided by J. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870
(1978); M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE (1977); and C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND
REUNION {1971).
The foregoing does not include all the works we consulted, let alone the excellent
writings we undoubtedly overlooked, or the unpublished source materials we ignored entirely. It is a sobering thought that this list merely scratches the surface.

